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Ecumenical Evangelical Legal  
Thought: The Contributions  
of Robert F. Cochran, Jr. 




This Essay organizes an assessment of Robert F. Cochran’s 
scholarly contributions around the theme of “ecumenical evangeli-
cal legal thought.”  Professor Cochran’s work bears the hallmarks 
of evangelicalism in its emphasis on the Bible, its practical focus, 
and its willingness to cross institutional and theological lines.  The 
Essay recounts some formative influences on Professor Cochran, 
discusses his methodology as a Christian scholar and specifically 
his use of the Bible in thinking about law, his work in legal ethics, 
and his work as a movement-builder.   It concludes with some ob-
servations about the reconciliation of ecumenism and evangelical-
ism in Cochran’s work and its implications for the future. 
  
 
 * Rose Professor of Law, The University of Alabama.  I am grateful to Bob Cochran for com-
ments on an earlier draft. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In this Essay, I will argue that Bob Cochran’s scholarly legacy is an ap-
proach to law and legal theory that I will label “ecumenical evangelical legal 
thought.”  No one who knows Bob or knows his work will be surprised at the 
“evangelical” portion of that label.  (Sadly, I feel the need to emphasize that I 
am using evangelical in the longstanding sense of a theological movement 
that has historically been compatible with a wide range of political positions.1)  
Bob is a born (again)-and-bred evangelical, whose life exemplifies the hall-
marks of traditional evangelical Christianity: a focus on the Bible, the singular 
importance of Christ’s atoning death, the need for personal conversion, and 
an activist approach to spreading the Gospel and social action.2 
In the era during which Bob (and I) came of age, however, the words 
ecumenical and evangelical did not go together.3  Evangelicals in the 1970s 
and 1980s associated the ecumenical movement with what they saw as the 
mainline Protestant establishment’s capitulation to theological liberalism.4  
While theological liberalism is a contested concept,5 evangelicals generally 
think of theology as “liberal” to the degree that it limits Christian doctrine to 
things human reason (as understood by the Enlightenment) can accept, rather 
than affirming the teaching of Scripture as understood by the church through 
 
 1. The Trump era (more particularly the behavior of “evangelical” leaders like Franklin Graham 
and Jerry Falwell, Jr.) has led many Christians to wonder whether they can still call themselves evan-
gelical.  See, e.g., Peter Wehner, Why I Can No Longer Call Myself an Evangelical Republican, N.Y. 
TIMES (Dec. 9, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/09/opinion/sunday/wehner-evangelical-re-
publicans.html [https://nyti.ms/2jCGudG]. 
 2. See DAVID W. BEBBINGTON, EVANGELICALISM IN MODERN BRITAIN: A HISTORY FROM THE 
1730S TO THE 1980S, at 217 (1989). 
 3. Neither did the words “catholic” and “evangelical,” although today, it is not difficult to find an 
evangelical who identifies as “catholic” or even a Catholic who identifies as evangelical. 
 4. Political liberalism was also important, as were issues of class and race.  To evangelicals, the 
flagship organization of Protestant ecumenism—the National Council of Churches—was not an ad-
mirable attempt to move toward renewed Christian unity (something Christ himself emphasizes in the 
prayers recorded in John 17), but an establishment interest group with a social gospel political agenda.  
Charles Austin, National Council of Churches Faces a New Type of Critic, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 3, 1982), 
https://www.nytimes.com/1982/11/03/us/national-council-of-churches-faces-new-type-of-critic.html 
[https://nyti.ms/29yVIhY].  The mainline denominations were populated by the economically and po-
litically powerful.  Sadly, racism undoubtedly played a role in evangelical resistance to liberalism, 
especially in the South.  See JEMAR TISBY, THE COLOR OF COMPROMISE: THE TRUTH ABOUT THE 
AMERICAN CHURCH’S COMPLICITY IN RACISM (2019).  Needless to say, a full treatment of these issues 
goes well beyond the scope of this Essay. 
 5. See 3 GARY DORRIEN, THE MAKING OF AMERICAN LIBERAL THEOLOGY: CRISIS, IRONY, AND 
POSTMODERNITY, 1950–2005 (2006). 
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the centuries.6 
A few decades later, things look a little—though not entirely—different.  
During the closing decades of the twentieth century, evangelicals developed 
their own version of ecumenism.  On one hand, they continued to leave main-
line Protestant churches, and those denominations have continued to fragment 
along traditional vs. liberal theological lines.7  On the other hand, evangelicals 
have been inclined to join together in spreading the Gospel and doing works 
of mercy and justice through cooperative ventures that cross denominational 
lines (“parachurch organizations”).8  In such settings and elsewhere, an evan-
gelical Methodist or Presbyterian might feel more at home with a fellow evan-
gelical of another theological heritage (or even a traditional Catholic) than 
with a more theologically liberal inheritor of her own tradition.9 
One area of continuity, from then to now, is that evangelicals have always 
prided themselves on being practically oriented.  One did not have to have a 
Ph.D. from Princeton or Yale to spread the Gospel, and many would have 
argued that this sort of education was likely to be a positive impediment to 
God’s work in the world.  To know and follow the words of Scripture was the 
main thing, and one could gain this knowledge on one’s own, at a Bible col-
lege, or at one of the many denominational or independent seminaries that 
 
 6. See generally Gerald R. McDermott, The Emerging Divide in Evangelical Theology, 56 J. 
EVANGELICAL THEOLOGICAL SOC’Y 355 (2013) (comparing the evolution of evangelical thought, par-
ticularly in terms of liberalism and conservativism, to other Protestant and Catholic traditions). 
 7. See PEW RESEARCH CTR., AMERICA’S CHANGING RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE 4 (2015), 
https://www.pewforum.org/2015/05/12/americas-changing-religious-landscape/ (follow “Complete 
Report PDF”). 
 8. Michael S. Hamilton, American Evangelicalism: Character, Function, and Trajectories of 
Change, in THE FUTURE OF EVANGELICALISM IN AMERICA 18, 30 (Candy Gunther Brown & Mark 
Silk eds., 2016). 
 9. Significant numbers of evangelicals have since discovered that their own theology was more 
“liberal” than they thought.  In the course of looking for ways to spread the Gospel in the nineteenth 
century, evangelical churches unwittingly borrowed (and retained) some then-current assumptions of 
the Enlightenment that were overly optimistic about the capacity of human reason to achieve a God’s-
eye view of the world.  See generally MARK A. NOLL, THE SCANDAL OF THE EVANGELICAL MIND 
(1994).  This was in direct contradiction to the traditional Protestant understanding of the effects of 
sin on the intellect, as well as traditional Christian understandings of human finitude and the particu-
larity of Christian belief.  While commitment to the Bible’s authority remains a hallmark of evangel-
icalism, there is perhaps a greater recognition now of Scripture’s narrative context, and the tension 
between the fundamental presuppositions of Christian and secular worldviews.  Evangelicals are also 
giving greater attention to the fact that Christianity is not solely a matter of intellectual assent to prop-
ositional truth but is primarily a matter of the affections of the heart.  See generally JAMES K.A. SMITH, 
DESIRING THE KINGDOM (2009). 
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were formed in reaction to theological drift in the mainline seminaries.  Alt-
hough this tendency can easily devolve into anti-intellectualism (and has all 
too often done so), its positive side is its assumption that theological 
knowledge is given for the purpose of being acted upon; as St. Paul writes, 
“Knowledge puffs up, but love builds up.”10  Evangelicalism was (and mostly 
remains) populist, practical, and movement-oriented. 
This too-brief sketch of the evangelical state of affairs will, I hope, pro-
vide some context for what I mean when I describe Professor Cochran’s work 
as ecumenical evangelical legal thought.  Professor Cochran’s work bears the 
hallmarks of evangelicalism in its emphasis on the Bible, its practical focus, 
and its willingness to work across institutional and theological lines.  I begin 
the Essay by recounting, in Part II, some influences and experiences that I take 
to be formative of Professor Cochran and therefore of his work.11  Part III 
discusses Cochran’s methodology as a Christian scholar and specifically his 
use of the Bible in thinking about law.12  Part IV discusses the practical aspects 
of Cochran’s scholarship with particular focus on his work in legal ethics.13  
Part V briefly discusses Cochran’s work as a movement-builder.14  I conclude 
with some observations about the reconciliation of ecumenism and evangeli-
calism in Cochran’s work and its implications for the future.15 
II. BOB COCHRAN’S VIEW FROM SOMEWHERE 
Bob Cochran was born in Greenville, South Carolina, and raised in vari-
ous cities in Virginia, where his father, Robert F. Cochran, pastored Baptist 
churches.  The elder Cochran was not just a Southern Baptist, but also an 
evangelical in the sense described above. 16  One of Bob’s prized possessions 
is a photograph of his father with a very young Billy Graham, who had come 
to Columbia, South Carolina, to speak for the parachurch organization Youth 
for Christ, which had been founded by Mr. Cochran. 
In the fall of 1973, Bob arrived in Charlottesville to begin his studies at 
 
 10. 1 Corinthians 8:1 (New Revised Standard Version). 
 11. See infra Part II. 
 12. See infra Part III. 
 13. See infra Part IV. 
 14. See infra Part V. 
 15. See infra Part VI. 
 16. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
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the University of Virginia School of Law.  Two developments of special sig-
nificance are worth noting.  First, Bob was one of the founding members of 
the Law Christian Fellowship, a group of law students that met regularly for 
prayer and Bible study (and still does).17  Second, in Bob’s third year, his 
mentor and future co-author, Professor Thomas Shaffer of Notre Dame Law 
School, arrived at the law school as a visiting faculty member. 18  Shaffer of-
fered a class on law and religion, which Bob would later describe in memora-
ble terms: 
[Shaffer] volunteered to teach a course on law and religion, in addi-
tion to his regular courses.  The Dean allowed it.  We met in the home 
that Shaffer and his wife Nancy rented.  On the first evening, we went 
around the room and told why we were taking the class.  All of the 
students identified themselves as Christians (though we might not all 
have recognized one another as such).  We came from a wide variety 
of theological backgrounds—Roman Catholics, Presbyterians, Meth-
odists, Baptists, an Armenian Orthodox, and a Mennonite.  When 
Shaffer realized that we were all confessing Christians, he asked one 
of us to pray.  As we bowed, I envisioned Thomas Jefferson, the 
founder of the University of Virginia and proponent of a “wall of 
separation” between church and state, looking down on us.  He was 
not pleased.  To this Baptist boy, however, it seemed to balance 
things out when we closed the class with beer.19 
I am not certain whether this class was the beginning of Bob’s evangelical 
ecumenism, but it was likely an important contributor.  Not only, as he notes 
above, were the members of the class from a wide variety of church back-
grounds, but Shaffer himself was the product of a remarkable convergence of 
religious influences—a Baptist who converted to Catholicism but whose chief 
intellectual influences were Anabaptist.20 
 
 17. See Our People: Bob Cochran, CTR. FOR CHRISTIAN STUDY, https://www.studycenter.net/peo-
ple/bob-cochran (last visited Nov. 9, 2019). 
 18. Robert F. Cochran, Jr., American Lawyers and Their Communities: Ethics in the Legal Pro-
fession, 16 J.L. & RELIGION 751, 752 (2001) (reviewing THOMAS L. SHAFFER & MARY M. SHAFFER, 
AMERICAN LAWYERS AND THEIR COMMUNITIES: ETHICS IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION (1991)). 
 19. Id. 
 20. See THOMAS L. SHAFFER, ON BEING A CHRISTIAN AND A LAWYER 218–20 (1981) [hereinafter 
SHAFFER, ON BEING A CHRISTIAN] (describing his spiritual journey and characterizing both the Baptist 
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Several Members of the University of Virginia Law Christian Fellowship, assembled for the  
Wedding of Bob Cochran (center, standing), June 19, 1982. 
 
Shaffer’s groundbreaking book, On Being a Christian and a Lawyer, 
emerged out of this class.21  In the afterword to the book, Shaffer expresses 
attitudes toward students, teaching, and scholarship that would be reflected in 
Cochran’s work going forward: 
I began this enterprise, and continue it, as a law teacher—nothing 
more than that, but nothing less.  Not a word is written ex cathedra.  
How could it be?  But every word is written because my students 
 
and Catholic church communities of which he was a part as “tragic”); see also Thomas L. Shaffer, The 
Radical Reformation and the Jurisprudence of Forgiveness, in CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL 
THOUGHT 321 (Michael W. McConnell, Robert F. Cochran, Jr. & Angela C. Carmella eds., 2001) 
[hereinafter CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES]. 
 21. SHAFFER, ON BEING A CHRISTIAN, supra note 20, at 227. 
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raise personal, confusing questions about being lawyers and Chris-
tians and Jews.  My confusion was blessed, early on, by a group of 
law students at the University of Virginia, in 1975 and 1976.  They 
were members of the Christian Law-Student Fellowship there and 
were enrolled in a group-study venture, in which I taught and learned, 
that was called law and religion.  All of them are now about their 
professional apostolates; I think of them often as a special audience 
for which I write.  They are: [students in the class, including Cochran, 
listed by name].22 
The Law Fellowship connection continued when Bob stayed in Charlottesville 
following graduation; he remained involved as a mentor to law students.  His 
relationship with Tom Shaffer continued as well when Shaffer moved to 
Washington & Lee University, and thereafter, back to Notre Dame. 23  Shaffer 
guided Cochran into law teaching and in his work as a scholar. 24 
A final important influence on Bob’s thought has been, of course, the 
Pepperdine community itself.  Although he was not a Church of Christ mem-
ber, Bob—now Professor Cochran—found Pepperdine Caruso Law School to 
be a congenial place to pursue his ambition to connect his faith and legal 
scholarship.25  Indeed, Cochran’s interests in doing legal scholarship eventu-
ally helped increase the law school’s emphasis on scholarly writing as a reg-
ular part of faculty responsibilities. 
III. TOWARD A BIBLICAL UNDERSTANDING OF LAW 
Given Professor Cochran’s background, it is not surprising that his ambi-
tion would be to bring his faith to bear on his work.26  The critical question, 
however, is what it would mean to do so.  One would assume that, as an evan-
gelical, he would be inclined to give biblical revelation pride of place in such 
a project.  But the details of even that approach are far from obvious.  A num-
ber of critical questions present themselves: What relevance might the Bible 
 
 22. Id. 
 23. See Cochran, supra note 18. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Years ago, he told me that “Pepperdine is on the far-left end of the Churches of Christ, which 
makes it a pretty comfortable place for a garden-variety evangelical to be.” 
 26. Even without the specifics of Bob’s background, one would not be surprised at the ambition.  
Human beings seem inclined to connect the most important features of their lives with their under-
standing of life in general. 
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have to a secular society’s legal system?  What is the relationship between 
what the Bible says about morality to civil law?  What status should be given 
to the portions of the Bible that served as the civil law for ancient Israel?  
Should they be followed?  What about those parts of the Bible that cannot be 
reduced to moral principle or civil command?  Do these portions have any 
relevance to the Christian legal scholar?  Not only that, but how is the Bible 
to be interpreted?  Should it be read through the lens of a particular faith tra-
dition?  Must it be? 
A. Scripture and Law: Cochran the Evangelical 
Professor Cochran’s work answers most of these questions, implicitly in 
some cases, explicitly in others, and with varying degrees of detail.  As noted, 
and not surprisingly, the Bible is front and center in Cochran’s work.  Indeed, 
the introduction to his co-edited (with seminary professor David VanDrunen) 
volume, entitled Law and the Bible: Justice, Mercy, and Legal Institutions, 
begins with a lengthy excerpt from Psalm 19, formatted so as to consume the 
entire first page: 
The law of the LORD is perfect, 
 refreshing the soul. 
The statutes of the LORD are trustworthy, 
 making wise the simple. 
The precepts of the LORD are right, 
 giving joy to the heart. 
The commands of the LORD are radiant, 
 giving light to the eyes. 
The fear of the LORD is pure, 
 enduring forever. 
The decrees of the LORD are firm, 
 and all of them are righteous. 
They are more precious than gold, 
 than much pure gold; 
they are sweeter than honey, 
 than honey from the honeycomb.27 
 
 27. See Robert F. Cochran, Jr. & David VanDrunen, Introduction to LAW AND THE BIBLE: JUSTICE, 
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As the title of the book illustrates, Cochran’s work28 begins in faith that 
the Bible will, in fact, have something meaningful to say about justice, mercy, 
and legal institutions.  Not only that, he also assumes that what it has to say 
can often be translated into insights about what the content of the law should 
be: 
What the Bible has to say about law is important for all the reasons 
that what the Bible has to say about anything is important.  The Bible 
shows us God’s will and character as it reveals him to us.  The Bible 
reveals that God is our creator and that law springs from his will and 
reflects his holy character.  The great hope of the Scriptures is that all 
God’s works—including law—will praise his name.29 
In Cochran’s case, boldness about the importance of what Scripture has 
to say is paired with appropriate modesty about our ability to understand its 
implications.  Cochran’s modesty is founded both in an awareness of evan-
gelical biblical interpretation’s indebtedness to tradition as well as in his in-
sistence on seeing the juridical task within the larger biblical narrative.  In this 
respect, Cochran’s approach to biblical authority is in line with the classical 
Reformation.  Consider these notes from the introduction to Law and the Bi-
ble: 
We fear that some Christians, on all points of the political spectrum, 
cherry-pick verses of Scripture to justify already-existing political 
opinions. . . .  Reading Scripture in both its immediate context and 
the context of all of Scripture will help to avoid such abuse.  Ulti-
mately, of course, by being attentive to all of Scripture we are atten-
tive to God himself, who speaks in and through the Scriptures, judges 
our faulty assumptions and unbelieving propensities, and gives us 
 
MERCY AND LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 13 (Robert F. Cochran, Jr. & David VanDrunen eds., 2013) [here-
inafter LAW AND THE BIBLE] (quoting Psalm 19:7–10). 
 28. As will be seen, Professor Cochran regularly works with co-authors and editors.  While I have 
identified co-authors and editors in the text and notes, given the focus of this Essay, after the initial 
reference, I will present the relevant ideas as Professor Cochran’s for the sake of simplicity.  In this 
instance, for example, the work referred to was jointly authored by Professors Cochran and 
VanDrunen. 
 29. Id. at 14. 
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greater insight into what all of life, including law, should be.30 
Cochran is not prepared to accept a Christian account of law that simply 
reduces divine revelation (whether in Scripture or though natural law) to a set 
of abstract principles appropriate for application by civil authorities.31  While 
he does not deny the significance of divine commands, he sees the heart of the 
matter as attempting to situate the legal scholar’s calling (or that of the judge 
or lawyer) in the context of the larger narrative of Scripture—i.e., the parts of 
the Bible that do not take the form of precepts and that answer the basic ques-
tions—humans must ask: “[W]hat [was I] put on earth to do, and what [could 
it] mean that I was put on earth to do it?”32  Central to that narrative in 
Cochran’s account are (i) the kingdom of God, (ii) love, and (iii) sin. 
For Cochran, the central feature of the biblical narrative is the kingdom 
of God, which is found wherever Christ is loved and obeyed.33  Even though 
the kingdom is a matter of obedience, it is not merely a matter of following 
laws.  Cochran and his co-author Dallas Willard note “the ambiguous nature 
of Jesus’ relationship to law”34 suggested in passages like John 1:17: “[T]he 
law indeed was given through Moses; grace and truth came through Jesus 
Christ.”35  Law alone is not enough; grace and truth are needed if the law is to 
be understood rightly, much less obeyed.  Furthermore, grace and truth are 
gifts found in Jesus and, by extension, in the renewed hearts and minds of 
those who follow him: “Law is valuable, but it needs to be understood in light 
of the teaching of the kingdom of God that the condition of the heart is pri-
mary.”36 
 
 30. Id. at 15.  It is worth noting that some contemporary evangelicals adopt an understanding of 
sola scriptura that is at odds with the understanding of the classical Reformation.  See KEITH A. 
MATHISON, THE SHAPE OF SOLA SCRIPTURA 237–53 (2001) (contrasting the Reformation understand-
ing with a modern evangelical misunderstanding Mathison designates as “solo” scriptura, which di-
vorces the reading of Scripture from the historic creeds of the church and biblical structures of church 
authority). 
 31. See LAW AND THE BIBLE, supra note 27, at 15. 
 32. 1 OLIVER O’DONOVAN, SELF, WORLD, AND TIME: ETHICS AS THEOLOGY, at ix (2013). 
 33. Robert F. Cochran, Jr. & Dallas Willard, The Kingdom of God, Law, and the Heart, in LAW 
AND THE BIBLE, supra note 27, at 156–57. 
 34. Cochran & Willard, supra note 33, at 152.  Again, much of the discussion in this section is 
taken from this jointly authored work.  This is not to minimize Professor Willard’s contributions to 
the paper in question or, more importantly, his influence on Professor Cochran, who revered him as a 
friend and mentor. 
 35. John 1:17 (New Revised Standard Version). 
 36. Cochran & Willard, supra note 33, at 160. 
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Cochran notes that when Jesus speaks of law, depending on the context, 
he might have in mind either the “Roman law, the Mosaic law as originally 
given by Moses, [or] the Mosaic law as expanded and interpreted by the Jew-
ish tradition of Jesus’ day.”37  Jesus’s reaction in encounters with the civil law 
and with then-current interpretations of Mosaic law included defiance, obedi-
ence, praise, criticism, reinterpretation, and affirmation.38  His “most striking 
response to law in his culture was to challenge it as a distorted expression of 
God’s moral law and of life in God’s kingdom .”39  As prophet, Jesus observed 
that the law of his day “had forgotten its purpose, [and] served itself and its 
experts, rather than the people.”40 
Jesus’s focus on the heart carries consequences for understanding, and 
living under, the various genres of law. The Sermon on the Mount is the cho-
sen starting point.  Here, Jesus 
contrasted the Jewish legal code with his heart-based kingdom.  The 
Jewish law prohibited murder, but Jesus called the citizens of this 
new kingdom not to even be angry. . . .  The Jewish law required 
oaths in some contexts, but Jesus prohibited oaths and taught that his 
followers’ word should be binding in all contexts.  The Jewish law 
imposed reciprocal penalties . . . but Jesus called the citizens of his 
new kingdom not to respond to violence in kind and to love their en-
emies.  Compliance with these startling, seemingly impossible com-
mands required (and requires) a change of heart.41 
This change of heart cannot simply be summoned up from within oneself.  
For Cochran the evangelical, it is supplied by the new birth, the fulfillment of 
God’s promise through the prophet Jeremiah to “put my law in their minds 
and write it on their hearts.”42  The gift of divine regeneration of the heart 
could “generate a far more radical change than human law could 
bring. . . .  [It] would cause someone to want to do the good, in most cases 
automatically to do the good.”43  Evil deeds likewise come from the human 
 
 37. Id. at 155. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 160. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 156 (citations omitted). 
 42. Jeremiah 31:33 (quoted in Cochran & Willard, supra note 33, at 155). 
 43. Cochran & Willard, supra note 33, at 156–57. 
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heart; the disordered loves that come naturally to each of us in our fallen state 
lead us to choose wrongly and to disregard the love we ought to have for God 
and for our neighbor.44  If the root problem is not addressed, the symptoms 
will inevitably persist. 
What implications has this analysis for the contemporary lawyer or legal 
scholar?  Cochran argues that those whose hearts have been transformed “will 
be far more likely to comply with most aspects of law” and “will go beyond 
the requirements of law,” that “a changed heart will lead one to be greatly 
concerned with justice.”45 
In the current moment, with the deficiencies of the contemporary evan-
gelical church so clearly on display, this may seem like far too rosy an assess-
ment.  One might wonder whether the evidence belies the claim for Cochran’s 
much-vaunted transformation of the heart, especially when it comes to law 
and politics.  Indeed, the belief in the new birth seems easily translatable into 
a belief in the believer’s moral superiority, and the glib supposition that eve-
rything would be okay “if only people like us were in charge.”46 
Investigating that charge in a systematic way would take us well beyond 
the scope of this project, but Cochran is sensitive to the objection.  To begin 
with, he does not associate conversion with an automatically changed heart.  
In a genuine conversion, which consists of repentance and faith, the seeds of 
change are present.  Nevertheless, the heart change that starts “may not get 
much farther.”47  Moreover, he singles out Jesus’s teaching about the central-
ity of the heart as “a check on his modern followers who might want a political 
or military kingdom . . . .  [T]he kingdom does not come through law.”48  Fi-
nally, he challenges a too-easy identification of the Gospel with contemporary 
political agendas.  Our problem is not, for example, either that we have too 
much government regulation or too little governmental intervention; by 
Cochran’s lights, we may have both problems at the same time: “Law should 
 
 44. For an exploration of these Augustinian themes in the context of justice and law, see Charles 
Mathewes, “Be Instructed, All You Who Judge the Earth”: Law, Justice, and Love During the World, 
in AGAPE, JUSTICE, AND LAW: HOW MIGHT CHRISTIAN LOVE SHAPE LAW? 166 (Robert F. Cochran, 
Jr. & Zachary R. Calo eds., 2017). 
 45. Cochran & Willard, supra note 33, at 157; see also id. (“Justice alone will never do justice to 
justice, but a heart of love will promote and require justice (and much more).”). 
 46. This particular manifestation of self-righteousness seems endemic to virtually all the partici-
pants in our current political moment, religious or secular. 
 47. Email from Robert F. Cochran, Professor of Law, Pepperdine Univ., to William S. Brewbaker 
III, Professor of Law, Univ. of Ala. (Aug. 17, 2019) (on file with author). 
 48. Cochran & Willard, supra note 33, at 157. 
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serve human good.  It can miss that objective when it is either so consumed 
with details that it loses sight of people or so weak that it fails to protect 
them.”49 
On the other hand, in the administration of law, character counts: “A cruel 
or irrational judge, prosecutor[,] or policeman can have a devastating effect 
upon public and private well-being and righteousness.  Who better than a per-
son living with Christ in Christ’s kingdom to administer law in a just man-
ner?”50  The phrase living with Christ in Christ’s kingdom no doubt bears em-
phasis in Cochran’s formulation, and the connection with love proves crucial.  
Jesus’s followers were “to love broadly . . . to love neighbors, Samaritans[,] 
and enemies.”51  Although he does not discuss it, Jesus’ presentation of the 
final judgment in Matthew 25 in terms of the “sheep” whose faith was evi-
denced by love and mercy and were welcomed into eternal life and the “goats” 
who, despite professing belief, were indifferent to the needs of those around 
them and were to be eternally punished.  Genuine love of God and neighbor 
is “the framework on which all of the law hangs ([Matthew] 22:35–40).”52  
Indeed, Cochran has said that whereas most of his career has been spent reach-
ing out beyond the evangelical community, “in this last part of my career, I 
am trying to speak to the evangelical community, at a time when we seem to 
have forgotten Jesus’s message of agapic love, love of the Samaritan, and love 
of the enemy.”53   
Love, then, is central to Cochran’s framework (so central in fact, that he 
later organized a conference and edited a volume entitled Agape, Justice, and 
Law, dedicated entirely to examining love’s role in Christian thought about 
law).54  Law, it turns out, is simply one more way of loving one’s neighbor: 
“Love can be reflected in laws as dramatic as those prohibiting murder and 
those ensuring that criminal defendants have fair trials to laws as seemingly 
 
 49. Id. at 161. 
 50. Id. at 164.  He also quotes Augustine, stating, “[The rule of Christians] is beneficial, not so 
much for themselves as for their subjects.”  See id. (alteration in original) (quoting AUGUSTINE, THE 
CITY OF GOD 88 (Gerard G. Walsh trans., Doubleday ed., 1958)). 
 51. Id. at 164. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Email from Robert F. Cochran, Professor of Law, Pepperdine Univ., to William S. Brewbaker 
III, Professor of Law, Univ. of Ala. (Aug. 18, 2019) (on file with author). 
 54. See AGAPE, JUSTICE, AND LAW, supra note 44; see also Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Jesus and the 
Mosaic Law: Agapic Love as the Foundation and Objective of Law, TOURO L. REV. (forthcoming 
2020). 
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mundane as those prohibiting drivers from double parking.”55  Critically, hu-
man law has only instrumental value; it is intended to serve the larger interest 
of human flourishing.56  Another implication of love as the framework for law 
is a concern for the most vulnerable members of society.  Cochran does not 
assume that this leads to a politics of Christian socialism, but he does “suspect 
that [Jesus] would affirm the Catholic teaching that laws . . . should be evalu-
ated first based on their impact on the poor.”57  Moreover, genuine concern 
for the poor requires attention not only to the provisions of the laws on the 
books, but also to its administration.58 
Not only that, loving one’s neighbors is not limited to protecting them 
from economic oppression, undeserved misfortune, or bureaucratic indiffer-
ence.  Law also has a role in shaping virtuous character in the name of love: 
“Law can and must reinforce the practices of the good.”59  This was a good 
effect, he argues, of the Old Testament laws that protected the poor.  Although 
there are limits to their character-building capacities, laws requiring farmers 
to permit poor people to glean from their fields, for example, ingrain gener-
osity and love for the poor as habitual behavior.60 
A final significant feature of Cochran’s Christian narrative is the fact of 
sin.  According to the Christian story, the default condition of every human 
heart is one of deceit and rebellion against God.  We are all sinners in need of 
grace, and this has a number of implications for our legal practices.  Those 
who make and administer law are no less in need of grace and forgiveness 
than are offenders.  They are obligated to love their enemies as well as their 
friends, and are to administer justice recognizing their kinship with the of-
fender, not as though the offender were “bad” and the judge “good.”61  More-
over, Christian punishment is never revenge born out of “hatred or vindictive 
passions.”62 
Although the fact of civil law is often attributed to the presence of sin in 
 
 55. Cochran & Willard, supra note 33, at 165. 
 56. See id. at 166 (quoting Mark 2:27) (“The Sabbath was made for man, not man for the Sab-
bath.”); see also Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Jesus, Agape, and Law, in AGAPE, JUSTICE, AND LAW, supra 
note 44, at 22–28. 
 57. Cochran & Willard, supra note 33, at 167. 
 58. See Cochran & Willard, supra note 33, at 167–68; see also Cochran, supra note 58, at 28–34. 
 59. Id. at 169. 
 60. See id. at 169. 
 61. Id. at 170; see also id. at 174 (endorsing the traditional formulation “justice tempered with 
mercy”); Cochran, supra note 58, at 14–15 (discussing the parable of the Good Samaritan). 
 62. Cochran & Willard, supra note 33, at 170 (quoting Jeffrie Murphy). 
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the world, the content of law is also affected.  It is not just a question of law’s 
identifying a locus of serious human rebellion, then specifying the correct 
moral standard and penalizing deviation from it.  Here, Cochran emphasizes 
Jesus’ teaching on the Mosaic law of divorce in Matthew 19.63  Jesus teaches 
that Moses allowed divorce “because your hearts were hard.”  In other words, 
“Jesus approved of civil law that explicitly permitted and even identified the 
procedures for deviations from God’s moral law” in view of the harsh conse-
quences that would otherwise ensue.64  Cochran sees this insight as a potential 
lens through which other Old Testament laws might be read,65 as well as a 
model for contemporary judges and legislators, who should “prudently and 
creatively craft laws with eyes fixed both on God’s moral law and on practical 
reality.”66 
A final lesson Cochran draws from the biblical narrative with respect to 
law is the need for humility.  Employing the story of Jesus’s encounter with a 
woman caught in adultery as a final case study, he suggests a number of pos-
sible insights that could be (and have been) taken from the story.  These in-
clude the priority of the heart in assessing one’s own motives in law enforce-
ment, injustice in the administration of the law, mercy, the appropriateness of 
Christian participation in civil government, Jesus’ fulfillment of the law’s 
penalty in his own body, and abolition of the death penalty.  In a fitting con-
clusion to the essay, Cochran and his co-author confess their inability to offer 
a definitive interpretation: 
We wish we could tell you which, if any, of the above lessons Jesus 
 
 63.  Matthew 19:3–9 states: 
And Pharisees came up to him and tested him by asking, “Is it lawful to divorce one's wife 
for any cause?”  He answered, “Have you not read that he who created them from the 
beginning made them male and female, and said, ‘Therefore a man shall leave his father 
and his mother and hold fast to his wife, and the two shall become one flesh’?  So they are 
no longer two but one flesh.  What therefore God has joined together, let not man separate.”  
They said to him, “Why then did Moses command one to give a certificate of divorce and 
to send her away?”  He said to them, “Because of your hardness of heart Moses allowed 
you to divorce your wives, but from the beginning it was not so.  And I say to you: whoever 
divorces his wife, except for sexual immorality, and marries another, commits adultery. 
Id. (quoting Genesis 1:27, 2:24). 
 64. Cochran & Willard, supra note 33, at 175 (quoting Aquinas on the need for distinction between 
legal and moral standards). 
 65. Including permitting slavery and sanctioning the death penalty for parental disrespect and ho-
mosexual conduct.  See id. at 177. 
 66. See id. at 179 (citing proposals to modify divorce law as examples of appropriately creative 
ways of honoring moral standards in a realistic way). 
[Vol. 47: 231, 2020] Ecumenical Evangelical Legal Thought 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
247 
intended to teach us in his encounter with the woman caught in adul-
tery.  Jesus does not always explain everything.  We hesitate to make 
things clear where Jesus seems intentionally to have left them un-
clear.  We leave the interpretation of this story to you, as Jesus did.67 
B. Legal Theory, Theology and Law: Cochran as Ecumenical 
1. Ecumenical Legal Theory 
One of Professor Cochran’s most visible early forays into the area of 
Christian legal thought was a symposium entitled “Christian Perspectives on 
Law and Legal Scholarship,” which he persuaded the Journal of Legal Edu-
cation to include in its March 1997 issue.68  The symposium, with contribu-
tions from Gerard V. Bradley, David S. Caudill, and David M. Smolin, fea-
tured short articles on Catholic, Calvinist, Lutheran, and Anabaptist 
perspectives on law.69  Professor Cochran’s introduction to the symposium is 
instructive for present purposes because he introduces categories that he 
would continue to use in later years. 
Postmodernism was an influential and relatively new movement in legal 
thought in the 1990s, and Cochran, no doubt partly in order to attempt to find 
some common ground with an audience that he rightly would have expected 
to be skeptical, offers a surprisingly “postmodern”70 account of the develop-
ment of his own Christian worldview.  He begins with his own story, noting 
the connection between the postmodern emphasis on narrative and the tradi-
tion of personal testimony in his evangelical heritage.71 
 
 67. See id. at 182. 
 68. See Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Christian Perspectives on Law and Legal Scholarship, 47 J. LEGAL 
EDUC. 1 (1997). 
 69. Id. 
 70. I use the scare quotes because postmodernism represents a family of theories that bear some 
resemblances to each other rather than a school of thought with recognizable principles.  See JEAN-
FRANCOIS LYOTARD, THE POSTMODERN CONDITION: A REPORT ON KNOWLEDGE, at xxiv (Geoff Ben-
nington & Brian Massumi trans., 1993) (defining postmodernism as “incredulity toward metanarra-
tives”).  Assuming that Lyotard’s famous definition is describing something central to the postmodern 
turn, the definition itself shows the difficulty.  It is difficult to conceive of incredulity toward metanar-
ratives as something other than a metanarrative. 
 71. Cochran, supra note 68, at 1.  Narratives remained important in Cochran’s scholarship.  See, 
e.g., Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Honor as a Deficient Aspiration for “The Honorable Profession”: The 
Lawyer as Nostromo, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 859 (2000); Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Crime, Confession, 
and the Counselor-at-Law: Lessons from Dostoevsky, 35 HOUS. L. REV. 327 (1998). 
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It is worth stopping and observing Cochran’s approach to engagement 
with the wider legal academy.  First and foremost, the symposium itself illus-
trates Professor Cochran’s view that Christian legal scholars should engage in 
ongoing conversations within the legal academy, rather than write about law 
(a) as if Christianity had nothing to add to those conversations, or (b) as if 
Christians could gain no insights about law or life from secular scholars.72  
The fact of the symposium was reflective of the first claim; Cochran’s intro-
duction, highlighting, as it does, points of commonality with secular scholars, 
reflects the second.73 
Cochran next opposes postmodernism to what he calls, appropriately 
enough, “enlightenment liberalism.”  Although, like postmodernism, liberal-
ism is a family of theories, Cochran has in mind the foundationalist aspect of 
the liberal tradition: 
Enlightenment liberalism asserts that it starts with observable data 
and assumptions that every reasonable person would share and con-
structs its view of reality by reason alone.  Science is its model of 
knowledge.  Everything is reduced to a science; law, as an academic 
discipline, is one of the social sciences.74 
Cochran is no foundationalist; the “raw bits of intellectual material” with 
which he starts consists both of “observations I make of the world around me” 
and “prerational assumptions . . . that I take on faith, some of which I learned 
growing up in my home and church, and some of which I learned in the largely 
secular schools I attended.”75  Interestingly, Cochran traces his (critical realist) 
anti-foundationalism both to “the postmoderns” and the Dutch Calvinists.76  
“Enlightenment liberalism’s faith in individualism, rationalism, autonomy 
and scientific naturalism,” he writes, “is just that, faith—faith that may or may 
 
 72. An alternative approach is to attempt to construct Christian perspectives on law that strive to 
be entirely universal and that are typically presented without any acknowledged engagement with 
extrabiblical sources.  See, e.g., Roger Bern, A Biblical Model for Analysis of Issues of Law and Public 
Policy: With Illustrative Applications to Contracts, Antitrust, Remedies and Public Policy Issues, 6 
REGENT U. L. REV. 103 (1995).  The cited source is more indebted to modernism than the author seems 
to be aware.  See generally NOLL, supra note 9. 
 73. These features of Cochran’s work are reflected in his work as a movement-builder, discussed 
infra Part V. 
 74. Cochran, supra note 68, at 2. 
 75. Id.  
 76. See, e.g., David S. Caudill, A Calvinist Perspective on Faith in Legal Scholarship, 47 J. LEGAL 
EDUC. 19 (1997). 
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not be justified.”77 
This observation has more than abstract importance.  As Oliver O’Do-
novan has observed, “[E]pistemology is a function of political theory.”78  
Those who would silence religious discourse about law appeal to the irration-
ality of such discourse, but if there is no gold standard for rationality, and 
everyone relies on prerational assumptions to some degree, then it is much 
harder to exclude religious speech about law out of hand.79  Cochran again 
offers a narrative to buttress inclusion of diverse voices in legal discourse: he 
recounts entering the legal academy when “enlightenment liberalism” was the 
hegemonic discourse and remarks that “to be accepted in academic circles and 
to be true to my view of reality,” would have required him to restrict his think-
ing to the zone of overlap between his worldview and enlightenment liberal 
dogma.80  He worried that he would write things he didn’t believe in order to 
achieve professional success and that his intellectual understanding of the 
parts of his faith that didn’t square with such dogma would wither away from 
disuse.81 
Cochran recognizes that the legal academy, then as now, includes schol-
ars with wildly differing worldviews, and that “[i]f the only scholarship were 
based on common assumptions, there would be little to write about.”82  And 
yet he notes that there may be wide areas of agreement between scholars with 
differing assumptions about fundamental realities.83  We can still learn from 
each other: “The best scholars are also considering the viewpoints of others.  
They are discovering odd combinations of shared beliefs, as well as disagree-
ment, between various groups.  Some who start from very different assump-
tions ultimately reach some of the same conclusions.”84 
 
 77. Cochran, supra note 68, at 3 (emphasis in original) (citing THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE 
OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 92–110 (2d ed. 1970); and then ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, WHOSE 
JUSTICE? WHICH RATIONALITY? (1988)). 
 78. See OLIVER O’DONOVAN, RESURRECTION AND MORAL ORDER: AN OUTLINE FOR 
EVANGELICAL ETHICS 86 (2d ed. 1994). 
 79. For a more extended discussion of the reasons religious speech should be admitted into legal 
discourse, see CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES, supra note 20, at xxii. 
 80. Cochran, supra note 68, at 2. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 3. 
 83. Id. (“Examples are the similar conclusions on lawyer advocacy, pornography, and the nature 
of morality that some feminists and Christians have reached.”). 
 84. Id. 
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2. Ecumenical Theology 
Cochran’s recognition of apparently intractable difference when it comes 
to starting points, and, at the same time, his optimism about the possibility of 
finding common ground in unlikely places, seems also to have led him to a 
welcoming approach toward intellectual collaboration across theological 
lines.  This is evident, of course, in the “Christian Perspectives on Law and 
Legal Scholarship” symposium itself, with its treatment of Catholic, Calvinist, 
Anabaptist, and Lutheran viewpoints on law, and, as we will see later, it is 
also quite evident in Cochran’s work as a conference organizer and movement 
builder. 
Perhaps this is not so remarkable.  After all, nothing in Cochran’s position 
as outlined above requires anyone to change her mind about her own most 
cherished beliefs.  Still, and as noted above, Cochran assumes that one’s be-
liefs are likely to change at least in spots, and, perhaps dramatically, through 
encounters with others.85 
In a landmark book written in the 1950s, H. Richard Niebuhr developed 
a taxonomy that grouped theologians and Christian traditions according to 
their attitudes about involvement in cultural matters.86  Niebuhr’s taxonomy 
is still in use today, even if it is heavily criticized in some quarters.87  His five 
groupings include synthesists, conversionists, separatists, dualists, and cul-
turalists (the distinctive features of each group are explained briefly below).88  
Professor Cochran employs these categories to bring order to the diverse the-
ological contributions in the 1997 symposium mentioned above.89  I will use 
 
 85. Cochran’s introduction uses the image of a cone to represent a person’s worldview.  He de-
scribes his experience: “At times the cone grows, as I gain insight—or, at least, think I gain insight.  
At times the cone shrinks, as I reconsider and reject earlier conclusions, as I determine that aspects of 
my view of reality do not fit with reality.  In fact, a cone is a very inadequate picture: a better picture 
would have irregularly shaped limbs growing out (and shrinking) at all sorts of odd places.”  Cochran, 
supra note 68, at 2. 
 86. H. RICHARD NIEBUHR, CHRIST AND CULTURE (1951). 
 87. As Cochran notes, two prominent separationists criticize Niebuhr’s categories for implicitly 
suggesting that “Christians are in an all-or-nothing relationship to the culture; that we must responsibly 
choose to be ‘all,’ or irresponsibly choose to be sectarian nothing.”  See Cochran, supra note 68, at 8 
(quoting STANLEY HAUERWAS & WILLIAM H. WILLIMON, RESIDENT ALIENS: LIFE IN THE CHRISTIAN 
COLONY 38 (1989)). 
 88. NIEBUHR, supra note 86, at xliii. 
 89. Cochran uses the categories again in one of his contributions to Christian Perspectives on Le-
gal Thought.  See Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Christian Traditions, Culture, and Law, in CHRISTIAN 
PERSPECTIVES, supra note 20, at 242, 250. 
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three of the five categories90 to describe elements of Cochran’s own work, 
taking up the question of how his work can reflect so many of these viewpoints 
coherently in the conclusion of this Essay. 
 a. Cochran the Synthesist 
In Niebuhr’s taxonomy, the synthesist theologian begins with the idea that 
human culture is an affirmative good—that reason and creation, like revela-
tion, are from God. 91  The knowledge creation and reason give is incomplete, 
but it can be improved and augmented with theological truths.  For Niebuhr, 
the primary exemplar of this point of view is Thomas Aquinas, whose 
system of thought . . . combined without confusing philosophy and 
theology, state and church, civic and Christian virtues, natural and 
divine laws, Christ and culture.  Out of these various elements he built 
a great structure of theoretical and practical wisdom, which like a ca-
thedral was solidly planted among the streets and marketplaces, the 
houses, palaces and universities that represent human culture, but 
which, when one had passed through its doors, presented a strange 
new world of quiet spaciousness, of sounds and colors, actions and 
figures, symbolic of a life beyond all secular concerns. . . . Like 
Schleiermacher later, he spoke to the cultured among the despisers of 
Christian faith . . . [b]ut with a Tertullian he acknowledged that what 
was hidden to the wise was revealed to babies.92 
Cochran’s synthetic approach is most obviously on display in his regular 
interactions with Catholic legal thought, which tends to be synthesist.93  In-
deed, much of Cochran’s approach to the relevance of Scripture to modern 
civil law bears a strong family resemblance to what Aquinas has to say in the 
 
 90. I leave aside Niebuhr’s dualist and culturalist categories.  Cochran largely rejects these ap-
proaches.  See Cochran, supra note 68, at 10 (describing the failure of the Journal of Legal Education 
symposium to include a culturalist perspective as “just as well”); Cochran & Willard, supra note 33, 
at 173 (rejecting “two-kingdoms” approach to the Sermon on the Mount). 
 91. NIEBUHR, supra note 86, at 130. 
 92. Id. 
 93. See, e.g., Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Tort Law and Intermediate Communities, in CHRISTIAN 
PERSPECTIVES, supra note 20, at 486; Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Catholic and Evangelical Supreme Court 
Justices: A Theological Analysis, 4 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 296 (2006). 
[Vol. 47: 231, 2020] Ecumenical Evangelical Legal Thought 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
252 
Treatise on Law.94  Like Aquinas, Cochran affirms natural law but likewise 
affirms that not every moral precept is to be written into the civil law.95  He 
recognizes that legal codes must vary according to the circumstances of the 
people who must live under them.96  He accepts that studying the laws in the 
Old Testament may provide insight but at the same time understands that those 
laws were given to a specific people under specific circumstances and should 
not be assumed applicable to modern conditions.97  Neither the Bible nor nat-
ural law answers every question lawyers might want to ask, much less in de-
tail.  Cochran thus summarizes the Christian legal scholar’s task as follows: 
With the moral foundation revealed in nature, and confirmed and 
clarified in Scripture, Christians must use godly wisdom and pru-
dence to seek to understand the world in which they live and the so-
cial circumstances in which particular problems arise.  They must ap-
ply the norms of Scripture and natural law in ways that produce just 
and beneficial results for their fellow human beings.98 
 b. Cochran the Separatist 
Niebuhr describes the separatist position as “one that uncompromisingly 
affirms the sole authority of Christ over the Christian and resolutely rejects 
culture’s claims to loyalty.”99  On this view, “[t]he counterpart of loyalty to 
Christ and the [Christian community] is the rejection of cultural society; a 
clear line of separation is drawn between the brotherhood of the children of 
God and the world.”100  Separatists expect that the believer who involves her-
self in government or the military will often find herself on the wrong side of 
the line of separation.101  The churches in the Anabaptist tradition, e.g., the 
Mennonites and Amish, provide the most obvious contemporary examples. 
Given the separatist’s emphasis on the difference between Christian and 
 
 94. See generally THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE IaIIae 90–108. 
 95. LAW AND THE BIBLE, supra note 27, at 15. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 18.  This approach’s emphasis on Scripture and lack of explicit reference to church tra-
dition gives it a Reformation accent, but the approach is nonetheless fairly characterized as a catholic 
(with a small “c”) Christian approach. 
 99. NIEBUHR, supra note 86, at 45. 
 100. LAW AND THE BIBLE, supra note 27, at 47–48. 
 101. Id. at 54–82. 
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secular communities, one would not expect to see much evidence of separatist 
thought in legal scholarship.102  If the realm of law and politics is off limits to 
the Christian, why spend much time thinking about it?  In fact, however, An-
abaptist thought has been surprisingly influential in contemporary legal schol-
arship.  Two of the most influential Anabaptist thinkers writing about the law 
have been Stanley Hauerwas103 and Professor Cochran’s mentor and co-au-
thor, Thomas Shaffer.  Interestingly, neither one of these scholars is part of an 
Anabaptist community,104 but both are keen to emphasize the disjunction be-
tween the ethics of the Kingdom and that of “the world.”105 
Perhaps the Anabaptist presence in the world of legal and political 
thought is not so surprising.  Anabaptists do not believe that the Christian faith 
is irrelevant to politics, or that there is no political role for Christians; rather, 
“the political task of Christians is to be the church rather than to transform the 
world.”106  The presence of an alternative community may influence the dom-
inant community’s politics and its law, even where that influence is not ac-
tively sought.107 
Augustine’s contrast between the city of God and the worldly city is an 
important image in separationist thought.  The hearts of those in the worldly 
city are set on the wrong things, and the resulting systems of ethics and politics 
inevitably reflect these misplaced loves.  The apparent virtues of ancient 
Rome are, for example, in the end, merely “splendid vices,” which the Gospel 
exposes as inconsistent with true love of God and neighbor.108  The ethics of 
those in power may have the appearance of goodness but be inimical to the 
true values of the Kingdom.  Not surprisingly, some critical legal theorists 
have found in Augustine and his critique of Rome a genial source of authority 
in their own critiques of the American legal system.109 
 
 102. Id. at 47–48. 
 103. See generally Symposium, Theological Argument in Law: Engaging with Stanley Hauerwas, 
75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1–251 (2012). 
 104. Hauerwas is a United Methodist and Shaffer was a Catholic. 
 105. See 1 John 2:15 (“Do not love the world.”). 
 106. See HAUERWAS & WILLIMON, supra note 87, at 38 (1989); Cochran, supra note 68, at 8 n.25. 
 107. See JOHN HOWARD YODER, On Not Being in Charge, in THE JEWISH-CHRISTIAN SCHISM 
REVISITED 168, 168–75 (Michael G. Cartwright & Peter Ochs eds., 2003). 
 108. This very Augustinian statement was apparently never made by Augustine himself.  See T.H. 
Irwin, Splendid Vices? Augustine For and Against Pagan Virtues, 8 MEDIEVAL THEOLOGY & PHIL. 
105, 106 (1999).  But see generally AUGUSTINE, THE CITY OF GOD, bk. 19 (Gerard G. Walsh trans., 
Doubleday ed., 1958). 
 109. See, e.g., Elizabeth Mensch, Cain’s Law, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 541, 542–43 (2009). 
[Vol. 47: 231, 2020] Ecumenical Evangelical Legal Thought 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
254 
One does not have to look far to find elements of Cochran’s thought that 
are, though never fully separatist, at least quite critical of prevailing “worldly” 
thought.  Consider his critique of the cultural norm of professionalism. 110 
Far from defending professionalism as a dominant legal/cultural norm 
that had been taken to guide legal ethics, Cochran’s critique of professional-
ism takes the ideal to task on economic, cultural, sociological, and ethical 
grounds.  His opening salvo takes aim at then-recent remarks from the presi-
dents of both the American Bar Association and the Association of American 
Law Schools, accusing them (indirectly) of using professionalism “almost as 
a mantra, a word which if repeated often enough will release mystical moral 
power” but which, alas, “no longer seems to inspire.”111  Traditional concep-
tions of professionalism, he argues, had religious origins that no longer have 
much influence in the legal profession.112  In the United States, professional 
ethics became merely the ethics of the aristocracy and “of gentlemen—the 
generic, Judeo-Christian ethics of the upper-class churches.”113 
Cochran provides a number of reasons for the demise of the consensus—
the opening of bar membership to outsiders “despite the resistance of the bar’s 
professional elites,”114 the development of a more egalitarian moral sense in 
the children of the upper class beginning in the 1960s,115 and moral relativism 
reinforced by postmodern skepticism of universally accessible moral truth.116  
And the news gets worse—attempts to establish a “new professionalism” are 
not only unlikely to be successful, they are affirmatively dangerous.117  “My 
concern,” he warns, “is not only that the new professionalism will fail to in-
spire lawyers to virtue, but that it will inspire them to vice.”118 
Cochran identifies the “new professionalism” with a number of disparate 
themes— a claim to expertise that justified protection of lawyers from market 
 
 110. See, e.g., Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Professionalism in the Postmodern Age: Its Death, Attempts 
at Resuscitation, and Alternate Sources of Virtue, 14 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 305 
(2000). 
 111. Id. at 305. 
 112.  Id. at 305–09. 
 113. Id. at 307.  Such a critique fits well with the skeptical attitude of the separationist tradition 
toward powerful institutions, whether religious or otherwise.  The ethics of the upper-class churches, 
it is suggested, have been taken captive by worldly norms rather than those of the Gospel. 
 114. See Cochran, supra note 110, at 308. 
 115. Id. at 310. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 311. 
 118. Id. 
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accountability,119 an ethic of role morality that serves client autonomy,120 and 
paternalism toward the client, either in the traditional form of giving moral 
direction to the client, or in the more modern form of assuming an obligation 
to pursue the client’s selfish ends at all costs, with little consultation of the 
client in the process.121  The result of this hodgepodge of understandings of 
the concept of professionalism, according to Cochran, has been self-regulation 
that served lawyers at least as well as it served the public,122 protection of the 
autonomy of the wealthy (who can afford lawyers) at the expense of the poor 
(who cannot),123 imposition of the lawyer’s moral code on their clients, and a 
system that encourages clients to disregard the interests of others.124 
These concepts of professionalism are, for Cochran, “both too weak and 
too dangerous to yield the responsible exercise of professional power.”125  
Cochran’s proposed solution is surprising: “[M]oral development,” he writes, 
“comes primarily from within communities.”126  As a result, “we should en-
courage these communities to develop moralities (and theologies) of lawyer-
ing.”127  Even if these moralities of lawyering will not transform the profession 
as a whole, they may affect the practice of significant numbers of lawyers.128 
Cochran anticipates the obvious objection that the law is a public profes-
sion, and his proposal seems to invite individual lawyers to practice law ac-
cording to values that are merely personal.129  He has, of course, already noted 
that there is no universally accepted norm for the lawyer’s role; indeed, that 
 
 119. Id. 
 120.  Id. at 311–12. 
 121. Id. at 313–14. 
 122. Id. at 311. 
 123. Id. at 312. 
 124. Id. at 313–14. 
 125. Id. at 314.  He continues:  
Other existing sources of lawyer guidance have their shortcomings as well.  The market 
generates high quality legal services for savvy, wealthy clients, but gives little aid to the 
poor and middle-class and tends to exacerbate the problems of lawyer advocacy as lawyers 
focus solely on the interests of their wealthy clients.  The rules of the profession and legal 
malpractice rules set minimum standards for lawyers, but law can only do so much.  It is 
impossible to require the virtues that the legal profession needs and excessive regulation 
can undercut the possibility of developing those virtues.  
See id. at 311. 
 126. See id. at 314. 
 127. See id. 
 128. Id. at 314–15. 
 129. See id. at 315 (“[I] have little faith that the person, acting alone, will come up with values, 
professional or otherwise, that are worth living by.”). 
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is a big part of the problem facing the “new professionalism.”130  Professional 
values “have little power to inspire.”131  The values of virtue-shaping commu-
nities not only have the capacity to inspire their adherents, but, Cochran ar-
gues, they cannot be dismissed as merely personal: “They draw on memories, 
stories, virtues, and rules that have their source beyond living memory; they 
have evolved over long periods of time, based on the wisdom of many that 
have gone before.”132 
Interestingly, Cochran’s proposal contains elements of both the synthesist 
and separatist positions described above, and also the conversionist perspec-
tive discussed next.133  Community values are cultural values, and he will later 
suggest that “as we go deeper into our particularities, we find commonali-
ties.”134  Something like natural law is evident, he argues, when we encounter 
the needs of the poor, and groups with diverse accounts of human meaning 
largely agree on the need for an account of law practice with greater space for 
recognizably humane values.135  The proposal has separatist overtones in its 
focus on the embodied ethics of particular communities and its resistance of 
the idea of shared civic principles of morality.136  At the same time, it lacks 
the sense of disengagement from the larger culture associated with separatist 
Christian traditions.137 
 
 130. See id. at 310–14.  “The [legal] profession gave up on defining the good lawyer; the Model 
Rules defined only the bad lawyer.  Attempts to establish a new professionalism face a similar pro-
spect.”  Id. at 310. 
 131. Id. at 315. 
 132. Id.  Cochran contrasts the power of the ABA Model Rule’s admonition that lawyers provide at 
least fifty hours of pro bono service per year to inspire lawyers to serve the poor with Jesus’ famous 
picture of the last judgment in Matthew 25:34–46.  Cochran, supra note 110, at 316–17. 
 133. For a discussion of the synthesis and separatist positions, see supra Sections III.B.2(a)–(b).  
For a discussion of the conversionist position, see infra Section III.B.2(c).  Cochran’s proposal is 
arguably conversionist in that he seems to be suggesting that the Christian revelation can serve as a 
corrective force to reigning conceptions of professional ethics.  See infra Section III.B.2(c). 
 134. Cochran, supra note 110, at 320 (suggesting this was the viewpoint of Martin Luther King, 
Jr.). 
 135. See id. at 318–19. 
 136. See supra Section III.B.2(a) (explaining that the separatist’s task is to focus on preserving the 
Christian community as an alternative to the dominant community). 
 137. Compare Cochran, supra note 110, at 315 (suggesting that communal religious traditions that 
have “evolved over long periods of time” are “resources that their members should look to, explore, 
critique, and draw from”), with NIEBUHR, supra note 86, at 47–48 (explaining that separatism is the 
“rejection of cultural society” such that a “a clear line of separation is drawn between the brotherhood 
of the children of God and the world”). 
[Vol. 47: 231, 2020] Ecumenical Evangelical Legal Thought 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
257 
 c. Cochran the Conversionist 
In Niebuhr’s typology, conversionists resemble dualists138 in terms of the 
seriousness with which they take human sin and its effects on culture.  Both 
believe that sin “is deeply rooted in the human soul, that it pervades all man’s 
work” and “all cultural work in which men promote their own glory, whether 
individualistically or socially . . . lies under the judgment of God.”139  Even 
so, conversionists bring a “more positive and hopeful attitude” to their cultural 
engagement.140  This optimism is based on a sense that God, as Creator, re-
mains sovereign over, concerned with, and engaged with his creation: “The 
Word that became flesh and dwelt among us, the Son who does the work of 
the Father in the world of creation, has entered into a human culture that has 
never been without his ordering action.”141  Contrary to the separatist position, 
the conversionist believes Christ’s redemption provides hope, not just for the 
individual and the church, but for culture as well.142 
As we have seen, Cochran’s work includes elements of both the synthesist 
and separatist positions.143  Even so, the conversionist approach to the relation 
and culture marks him most strongly.  In addition to his work in theology and 
jurisprudence, Professor Cochran also dedicated a large portion of his schol-
arly energies to the field of professional ethics.144  As examined in the next 
part, Cochran is nothing if not a reformer when it comes to legal ethics, not 
only proposing that Christian lawyers conduct their practices in specific ways 
that would put them at odds with conventional legal approaches (admonitions 
that might sit easily with a separatist view), but also proposing reforms to the 
 
 138. Niebuhr’s dualists, according to Cochran, generally see culture as “necessarily fallen and un-
redeemable, but . . . believe[] that Christians appropriately play a role within it.”  See Cochran, supra 
note 68, at 9 (using Martin Luther King, Jr. as a main example of a dualist). 
 139. NIEBUHR, supra note 86, at 191. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. at 193. 
 142. Id. at 195–96. 
 143. See supra notes 133–37 and accompanying text. 
 144. See, e.g., Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Legal Ethics and Collaborative Practice Ethics, 38 HOFSTRA 
L. REV. 537, 538 (2010) (describing the “legal and ethical standards” under which professionals en-
gage in Collaborative Practice—a new process for resolving legal disputes—in the United States); 
Robert F. Cochran, Jr. & Thomas L. Shaffer, “Technical” Defenses: Ethics, Morals, and the Lawyer 
as Friend, 14 CLINICAL L. REV. 337, 337–53 (2007) [hereinafter Cochran & Shaffer, “Technical” 
Defenses] (suggesting that lawyer-client counseling on the issue of “technical” defenses, such as stat-
ute of limitations defenses, raises moral issues “worthy of dialogue”). 
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secular rules that govern all lawyers’ practice and sanctions for their disobe-
dience, in some cases from professional disciplinary bodies, and in others, by 
tort sanctions. 145 
IV. THE LAWYER AS DISCIPLE AND FRIEND: COCHRAN’S LEGAL ETHICS 
The starting point of Cochran’s legal ethics is arguably a model of lawyer-
client relations that he and Thomas Shaffer first developed in their 1994 book 
Lawyers, Clients, and Moral Responsibility.146  Their model relied heavily on 
arguments developed by Shaffer in previous writings.147  The model proceeds 
upon two moral premises that would be unremarkable in ordinary life, but 
seem almost shocking when applied to lawyer-client relationships.148  These 
premises are (1) that moral agents (and those who advise them) ought to con-
sider the effects of their choices on other people;149 and (2) that moral agents 
(and those who advise them) ought to respect each other in the process of 
moral deliberation.150  An important feature of the model is its assumption that 
decisions taken in the course of legal representation are best understood as 
joint decisions—decisions for which both the lawyer and the client bear some 
degree of responsibility and authority.151 
Cochran and Shaffer apply these principles in both constructive and crit-
ical ways to address two common questions that arise in legal ethics: Who 
controls the decisions being made in the course of legal representation?  And, 
should the interests of people other than the client be considered?152  It is pre-
 
 145. See infra Part IV. 
 146. THOMAS L. SHAFFER & ROBERT F. COCHRAN, JR., LAWYERS, CLIENTS, AND MORAL 
RESPONSIBILITY 113–34 (1994). 
 147. See, e.g., SHAFFER, ON BEING A CHRISTIAN, supra note 20; Shaffer, supra note 20. 
 148. See SHAFFER & COCHRAN, supra note 146, at 1–2. 
 149. See id. at 1 (“[A]lmost all decisions made in the law office will benefit some people at the 
expense of others.”). 
 150. Id. at 2 (“If the law becomes the only limitation on human action, the state will either leave 
people to be uncivil toward one another, or intrude into more and more aspects of human life.”). 
 151. See id. at 113 (“When lawyer and client together resolve issues in legal representation (as we 
believe they should), lawyer and client engage in moral discourse; they engage in moral reasoning 
together.”). 
 152. Id. at 3; see also Thomas L. Shaffer & Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Lawyers as Strangers and 
Friends: A Reply to Professor Sammons, 18 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 69, 69 (1995) [hereinafter 
Shaffer & Cochran, Lawyers as Strangers and Friends].  The latter question is critical and affects 
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cisely here that the ordinary moral premises noted above become controver-
sial.153  Lawyers may or may not agree about the extent to which the client’s 
moral views about the course of the representation should be respected—after 
all, the lawyer is the expert and may or may not be willing to involve herself 
in moral taint for the sake of the client’s wishes.154  Lawyers also may not 
agree that their advice to clients ought to include concern for the effects of the 
client’s decisions on other people—the lawyer’s job, after all, is to represent 
her client!155 
Let us begin with the question of whether the lawyer and the client should 
be concerned with the effects of their decisions on other people.156  Here, 
Cochran takes issue with so-called “client-centered” lawyering, which, con-
sistent with mainstream liberal political theory, makes advancing the individ-
ual autonomy of the client a guiding objective.157  The supposed moral 
strength of this approach to lawyering—specifically, its respect for the client’s 
autonomy and dignity, and its capacity to place the lawyer in an appropriately 
“neutral” role in order to achieve that result—is what Cochran finds most ob-
jectionable: 
The client-centered counselors claim to be neutral, but in fact, their 
decision-making framework steers the client toward making self-
serving choices.  It imposes a regime of client autonomy—clients are 
directed to make choices based on consequences to them-
selves. . . .  The Enlightenment liberal ideal is C.S. Lewis’s picture of 
hell from “The Great Divorce”: Autonomous people on the outskirts 
 
Cochran’s insights about issues outside professional ethics.  Consider, for example, his endorsement 
of restorative justice: “Whereas the primary players in the traditional American criminal justice system 
are the state and the offender, restorative justice brings the victim and the community into the picture.”  
Robert F. Cochran, Jr., The Criminal Defense Attorney: Roadblock or Bridge to Restorative Justice?, 
14 J.L. & RELIGION 211, 212 (1999–2000) [hereinafter Cochran, Roadblock or Bridge]. 
 153. See SHAFFER & COCHRAN, supra note 146, at 3–4. 
 154. See id. at 35; Shaffer & Cochran, Lawyers as Strangers and Friends, supra note 152, at 69 
(explaining that “[t]he lawyer as godfather controls the representation and ignores the interests of oth-
ers”). 
 155. See SHAFFER & COCHRAN, supra note 146, at 7 (explaining that lawyers as advocates often 
“attack other people at the behest of their clients”); Shaffer & Cochran, Lawyers as Strangers and 
Friends, supra note 152, at 69 (noting the “lawyer-as-hired gun defers to the client and ignores the 
interests of others”). 
 156. See Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Enlightenment Liberalism, Lawyers, and the Future of Lawyer-
Client Relations, 33 CAMPBELL L. REV. 685 (2011). 
 157. Id. at 686–88. 
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of a city who continually move further and further away from one 
another.158 
Cochran acknowledges that in many cases, the lawyer’s role in empow-
ering the client can be a positive good.159  This is especially true when lawyers 
are representing poor people against rich opponents—the rich will have plenty 
of resources with which to look after their own interests.160  On the other hand, 
“[i]f clients with great power make decisions based solely on ‘consequences 
to the client’ they can cause great harm to others.”161 
The second critical question for Shaffer and Cochran is who controls the 
decisions made during the course of the representation.162  Note that this ques-
tion is analytically distinct from the preceding one: a lawyer might believe 
that she should pursue the client’s interests alone without regard for others’ 
interests, and that, as the lawyer, her judgments about where those interests 
lie should govern the concrete decisions that are actually made.163  Or, the 
lawyer might believe that every decision with moral significance ought to be 
made by the client alone, with the lawyer in a more-or-less ministerial role.164 
The traditional answer to the second question places both moral and legal 
decision making primarily in the hands of the lawyer: “The early American 
gentleman-lawyer asserted control of legal representation based on his [as-
sumed] superior social status, superior influence, superior intelligence, and 
superior moral sensitivity.”165  Lawyer authority also protected the con-
sciences of the lawyer and the client, lest, in the heat of battle, immoral deci-
sions might be made.166  As Judge Clement Haynsworth once wrote, “[T]he 
lawyer must never forget that he is the master.  He is not there to do the client’s 
bidding.  It is for the lawyer to decide what is morally and legally right[.]”167 
 
 158. Id. at 688. 
 159. Id. at 689 (“In some situations, it may be that the client-centered counselors’ focus on client 
empowerment is justified.”). 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. 
 162. See SHAFFER & COCHRAN, supra note 146, at 3. 
 163. See, e.g., Shaffer & Cochran, Lawyers as Strangers and Friends, supra note 152. 
 164. See id. 
 165. Cochran, supra note 156, at 689. 
 166. See id. at 690 (“[T]here are troubling aspects of the authoritarian approach. . . .  There is danger 
that lawyers will be confident of their moral judgment when confidence is not justified. Generally, 
two consciences in conversation are more likely to get moral truth than one.”). 
 167. See id. at 689 (quoting Clement F. Haynsworth, Professionalism in Lawyering, 27 S.C. L. REV. 
627, 628 (1976)). 
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Despite the emphasis on morality that underlies this model, Cochran has 
little patience with it.168  Indeed, he accepts the liberal lawyer’s characteriza-
tion of it as “authoritarian.”169  There is no reason to believe that lawyers are, 
as a group, possessed of moral insight superior to that of clients as a group.170  
Cochran believes that humility is an important lawyer virtue.171  Authoritarian 
lawyering exalts lawyer expertise in a way that is “inconsistent with love of 
neighbor, inconsistent with a recognition of the client as a fellow child of 
God[,] . . . [and it] robs the client of the opportunity to grow morally.”172 
The significance of moral development to human flourishing also informs 
Cochran’s reservations about the approach to lawyering that suggests that 
lawyers ought to be willing to pursue their clients’ interests through any law-
ful means, even when those means contradict the lawyer’s conscience.  Neu-
trality toward client ends proves, for Shaffer and Cochran, an illusory basis 
for justifying immoral acts.173  Failure to stand up to immoral conduct is itself 
a moral choice, and one that does lasting damage to the lawyer: 
Morality is a skill like other skills; it is something that we learn by 
doing.  As we address problems morally, we develop the capacity to 
deal morally with other problems. If moral sensitivity has no place in 
lawyers’ daily lives, they run the risk that their moral sensitivity will 
atrophy.174 
The foregoing critique of conventional approaches to the lawyer-client 
relationship yields an evocative taxonomy of approaches to lawyering: law-
yers can be godfathers, gurus, hired guns, legalists, or friends (the latter being 
the preferred concept): 
The godfather lawyer ignores the interests of other people, keeps the 
issue to himself, and does what he thinks will benefit the client.  The 
 
 168. See id. (“Some are surprised that as a Christian, I do not advocate an authoritarian approach to 
lawyering.”). 
 169. See id. 
 170. See id. at 690 (“None of us has the perfect ability to discern moral standards or to determine 
how they should apply.”). 
 171. See id. (stating that the authoritarian approach is “inconsistent with the humility with which 
lawyers should view themselves”). 
 172. See id. 
 173. SHAFFER & COCHRAN, supra note 146, at 28–29. 
 174. See id. at 29. 
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hired gun defers to whatever the client wants to do.  The guru con-
siders the interests of other people, and controls the decision by ag-
gressively persuading the client to do what the lawyer believes to be 
the right thing. . . .  [The legalist] assumes and justifies the morality 
of the law. . . .  [N]either the lawyer nor the client controls the deci-
sions.  The morality of the law controls the decisions.175  [T]he lawyer 
as friend . . . raises the moral issue with the client, engages the client 
in moral conversation, and seeks to arrive at moral decisions with the 
client.  Only when the client insists on doing something the lawyer 
believes to be wrong—only, that is, when moral conversation fails—
would the lawyer-as-friend insist on following his own conscience.176 
The preferred model of the lawyer as friend does not mean that the law-
yers should seek to be friends, in the ordinary sense of that word, with every 
client they encounter.177  Rather, the lawyer and client should deal with moral 
issues that arise in representation in the way that friends deal with moral is-
sues.178  Even this limitation raises questions, however: How, exactly, do 
friends deal with moral issues?  What does it mean to be a friend? 
Shaffer and Cochran recognize that the debate about the lawyer-client re-
lationship cannot be settled simply by invoking the notion of friendship; just 
as there are competing accounts of the lawyer-client relationship, there are 
also competing accounts of what it means to be a friend.179  Shaffer and 
Cochran’s preferred account of friendship is Aristotle’s, which includes the 
idea (surprising today) that friends are engaged in common moral projects.180  
For Shaffer and Cochran, however, the idea of a friend as “a collaborator in 
the good” is the lynchpin of their application of friendship to the lawyer-client 
 
 175. Cochran & Shaffer, “Technical” Defenses, supra note 144, at 337, 348.  The “legalist” is con-
cerned neither with the impact on others, nor with the moral concerns of either the lawyer or the client.  
The legalist lawyer is governed by the values embedded in the law itself, such that any relevant moral 
concerns are deemed to have already been taken into account.  Whatever courses of action the law 
permits are thereby deemed moral.  See id. 
 176. See id. 
 177. SHAFFER & COCHRAN, supra note 146, at 47. 
 178. See id. (“The lawyer should raise moral issues with the client in the way that good friends deal 
with moral issues, neither ignoring them nor imposing their values on the friend, but raising them as 
matters for discussion.”). 
 179. See id. (noting that “we live in what Alasdair MacIntyre describes as a society of strangers”). 
 180. See id. (“We use the term ‘friend’ in its traditional meaning, as developed by Aristotle.”). 
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relationship.181 
Again, we see that Shaffer and Cochran assume that legal representation 
involves joint decision making (the lawyer and client are, in this sense, “col-
laborators”), and that decision making involves moral choices (they collabo-
rate “in the good”).182  Again, following Aristotle, Shaffer, and Cochran agree 
that friendship (and thus the lawyer-client relationship) is, ideally, a “school 
for virtue.”183  Like a friendship, the lawyer-client relationship can present 
moral issues that allow both lawyers and clients to better learn to care for 
others and present opportunities for conversations that allow the collaborators 
to see more clearly the truth about themselves and the situation they face.184  
Finally, both friendships and lawyer-client relationships involve a shared de-
liberation about what constitutes a good course of action in a given situa-
tion.185 
The friendship relationship relativizes the moral framework of profes-
sionalism through which contemporary lawyers and clients are likely to view 
the lawyer-client relationship: “When a client is your friend,” Shaffer and 
Cochran write, “client interest is not so much a purpose as a project.”186  On 
this account, friends are interested in becoming better, more virtuous people, 
even if this involves some degree of mutual moral correction.187 
Many would acknowledge that there is a surface appeal to thinking of the 
lawyer-client relationship in terms of friendship, especially since Shaffer and 
Cochran are careful to structure the model in a way that attempts to assure that 
lawyers and clients are equals in the moral deliberation that ensues.188  On the 
other hand, however, why should ethical practices for a public profession like 
law be built around a confessedly controversial notion of what lawyer-client 
 
 181. See id. at 49 (“Most importantly, friendship is a relationship in which the lawyer sees the client 
as a collaborator in the good.”). 
 182. See id. at 49, 50 (“Friends can help us to be better people by helping us to determine the right 
thing to do.”). 
 183. See id. at 47. 
 184. See id. at 45–50. 
 185. Id. at 50 (noting that “[d]etermining what the good requires can be a difficult task” and such 
“hard thought” requires the help of friends). 
 186. Id. at 50. 
 187. See id. at 47, 48 (citing AQUINAS, supra note 94, II, Q.33, 1333–41). 
 188. See id. at 48–52. 
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relationships should be?  Would it not be better to build those rules and prac-
tices around moral conceptions that we all share?189  What is the use of a self-
consciously particularist model of the good life as applied to lawyer-client 
relations? 
Professor Cochran’s legal ethics scholarship provides a number of an-
swers to these questions.190  First, he does not concede that the sought-after 
neutral principles around which we might build a universally acceptable 
model of legal ethics are available.191  Indeed, as noted earlier, he argues that 
adverting to broad concepts like “professionalism” to paper over our disagree-
ments is likely to do more harm than good.192  So, what is to be done? 
Interestingly, Cochran makes moves that operate on parallel tracks.  The 
separatist Cochran suggests that even if mainstream practitioners might be 
uncomfortable with practicing law under a friendship model, some lawyers 
should do so anyway.193  And he buttresses this suggestion with articles at-
tempting to demonstrate that legal rules do not place the friendship model 
beyond the pale.194  The Model Rules, he notes, specifically authorize lawyers 
to bring moral judgments into the lawyer client relationship.195  More dramat-
ically, relevant ethical standards do not prevent cooperation between lawyers 
to generate a good result in a given situation, even where such an approach 
might result in an individual client receiving a smaller recovery than might 
otherwise be attainable.196  Even criminal lawyers, he argues, may want to 
 
 189. See, e.g., Alice Woolley & W. Bradley Wendel, Legal Ethics and Moral Character, 23 GEO. 
J. LEGAL ETHICS 1065, 1084 (2010) (highlighting the importance of a lawyer’s “ability to analyze the 
moral commitments embedded in and underlying the legal system within which she works”). 
 190. See infra notes 193–202 and accompanying text. 
 191. See Cochran, supra note 110, at 308–12 (“There is probably less common moral ground within 
the legal profession now than in 1983.”). 
 192. See id. at 311. 
 193. See SHAFFER & COCHRAN, supra note 146, at 48–49 (discussing four reasons lawyers may be 
hesitant to discuss moral issues under the friendship model). 
 194. See id. at 52 (“The local nature of law practice makes it likely that lawyers will share, or at 
least be familiar with, the moral values of their clients, as clients are likely to be attracted to lawyers 
who share their moral values.”). 
 195. See id. at 48 n.11 (citing to MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 2.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2008)) 
(stating “in rendering advice, a lawyer may refer not only to the law but to other considerations such 
as moral . . . factors, that may be relevant to the client’s situation”). 
 196. See Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Collaborative Practice’s Radical Possibilities for the Legal Pro-
fession: “[Two Lawyers and Two Clients] for the Situation,” 11 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 229 (2011); 
Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Legal Ethics and Collaborative Practice Ethics, 38 HOFSTRA L. REV. 537 
(2009); Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Louis D. Brandeis and the Lawyer Advocacy System, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 
351 (2013). 
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discuss the moral benefits of confession with their clients (although Cochran 
is quick to add that there may be good reasons that a client will not want to 
confess).197 
At the same time, Cochran’s thickly conceived account of what appropri-
ate lawyer-client relations should look like gives rise to bold “conversionist” 
suggestions about what the law governing all lawyer-client relationships 
should become.198  For example, Cochran advocates that tort standards and 
professional rules should place greater limits on the tactical decisions that 
lawyers can make without client consent when such decisions have the poten-
tial to inflict relational harms to their clients.199  Similarly, he argues that the 
common requirement that clients plead either “guilty” or “not guilty” has 
moral ramifications for victims and thus should be abandoned.200  In the ab-
sence of a plea, the state would simply be obligated to prove its case as it 
currently must, but the client should otherwise not be forced to make a plea 
that a layperson would likely perceive to be a lie.201 
V. COCHRAN AS COMMUNITY ORGANIZER 
As detailed above, Professor Cochran’s theoretical and practical contri-
butions to legal scholarship have been substantial and innovative.  That said, 
his most lasting contributions will, in all likelihood, have been made in his 
work as an important force in helping create and sustain Christian legal schol-
arship as a field of study.  His most influential work, the 2001 Yale University 
Press volume Christian Perspectives on Legal Thought (co-edited with Mi-
chael McConnell and Angela Carmella) was the most visible American con-
tribution to self-consciously Christian legal scholarship in decades; so much 
so, that when Harold Berman wrote the foreword to the book, he suggested 
 
 197. See Cochran, Roadblock or Bridge, supra note 152, at 222. 
 198. See, e.g., SHAFFER & COCHRAN, supra note 146, at 49 (recommending a drastic shift in how 
lawyers operate and how they are perceived). 
 199. See Robert F. Cochran, Jr., ADR, the ABA, and Client Control: A Proposal that the Model 
Rules Require Lawyers to Present ADR Options to Clients, 41 S. TEX. L. REV. 183, 197–98 (1999); 
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that Christianity “ha[d] been a taboo subject in twentieth-century American 
legal education.”202  The book consisted of essays that began as presentations 
at meetings of the Law Professors Christian Fellowship, a group that—in the 
early years—Professor Cochran almost single-handedly organized, recruited 
speakers for, raised money to support, and in which he remained the leading 
force for the roughly two decades of its existence.203  Once Professor Cochran 
became the founding director of the Nootbaar Institute on Law, Religion, and 
Ethics at Pepperdine, the annual conferences there became unofficial gather-
ing and networking sites for meetings of Christian law professors.204 
Cochran’s ecumenical evangelical approach was visible from the begin-
ning in these meetings, as well as in the books and articles they spawned.  As 
already noted, the 1997 Journal of Legal Education symposium featured arti-
cles from Catholic, Calvinist, Anabaptist, and Lutheran perspectives about 
law.205  Christian Perspectives on Legal Thought, still in print nearly 20 years 
later, widens the circle, featuring articles not only from differing theological 
perspectives, but also offering Christian perspectives influenced by critical 
race theory, feminist thought, economic analysis, and other approaches.206 
Cochran and Richard Garnett organized a group of Catholic and 
Protestant law professors that produced not only a statement of common 
Christian principles regarding law, “but many significant friendships among 
those in [the] two communities.”207  Pepperdine conferences yielded edited 
volumes published by elite university presses and Pepperdine Law Review 
symposia on subjects including the relationship between law and Christian 
love, “higher law,” and the Bible.208  These conferences included not only a 
diversity of theological perspectives, but also those from other faiths and no 
religious faith.209  And Cochran’s organizing and editing skills resulted in at 
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least one volume on religious legal thought that moved beyond Christian ecu-
menism to interfaith dialogue.210 
The conferences Cochran organized and the publications that resulted did 
more than simply provide new resources for those desiring to understand the 
relevance of Christian thought for law, legal theory, and law practice.  They 
provided venues for scholarly publications that facilitated the research itself, 
opportunities for friendships and professional relationships, a forum for dis-
cussion and presentation of ideas that were and remain, for the most part, out-
side the mainstream of legal scholarship, and an enhanced understanding be-
tween scholars of different backgrounds and viewpoints.  Future scholars 
interested in the relationship between Christianity and law will find more and 
better resources available because of Professor Cochran’s investment in oth-
ers. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Even if one appreciates the evident generosity of spirit underlying Pro-
fessor Cochran’s approach to law and legal theory, one might still wonder 
whether it makes sense to be an ecumenical evangelical.  Is it possible to hold 
together so many disparate approaches (even disparate Christian approaches) 
with intellectual integrity? 
In one of his contributions to Christian Perspectives on Legal Thought, 
Professor Cochran provides three possible answers.211  The first he calls “bal-
ance,” suggesting that Christians should be able to gain insights from each 
other’s traditions.212  “Synthesists,” he writes, 
remind Christians that we can learn from culture; conversionists re-
mind us that we can have an impact on this fallen world; separatists 
remind us of the temptations . . . that accompany involvement with 
culture; dualists remind us that our views are also corrupted; and cul-
turalists remind us of the ways in which culture may already coincide 
with Christian teaching.213 
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Cochran also argues that responding to culture in one’s own moment re-
quires us to “read[] the times.”214  Taking the Bible as his primary source, 
Cochran notes that different figures responded to issues of law and politics in 
different ways, depending on the situation in which the people of God found 
themselves.215  Finally, he argues that the proper response may be a “matter 
of calling. . . .  God might call some to play one role and others to play an-
other.”216 
While I agree with all three of Professor Cochran’s suggestions on this 
front, I am not sure they would be persuasive to, for example, a “committed” 
separatist.217  I suspect that these suggestions are more helpful to explain the 
benefits of separatist or synthesist thought to conversionists, like Cochran and 
me, than, for example, to persuade committed separatists that secular culture 
has lessons to teach them after all, or to persuade committed culturalists that 
the Bible requires their preferred culture to change its ways in important re-
spects. 
My guess is that the drivers of Professor Cochran’s ecumenical evangel-
icalism run deeper than these particular arguments and reflect more the Chris-
tian virtues of humility and modesty (too little seen in current times) than a 
tightly reasoned conception of the way Niebuhr’s five categories might some-
how fit together after all.  One could argue (and I now shall) that for Professor 
Cochran, the more important categories for his approach to law and legal the-
ory are the old evangelical categories of creature and redeemed sinner.  The 
full body of Professor Cochran’s work reflects not only a commitment to the 
life of the mind as usually understood, but also a commitment of the heart—
his understanding of himself as finite and therefore not in possession of all 
knowledge, fallen and therefore needing correction wherever it can be found, 
and called to love the Lord his God with heart and mind and soul and strength 
and his neighbor as himself. 
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